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Abstract:  We compared results of safety climate survey questions from healthcare respondents 
with those from a high reliability organization, naval aviation.  Separate surveys containing a 
subset of 23 similar questions were conducted among employees from 15 hospitals and from 
naval aviators from 226 squadrons.  For each question a "problematic response" was defined that 
suggested an absence of a safety climate.  Overall the problematic response rate was 5.6% for 
naval aviators, versus 17.5% for hospital personnel (p<0.0001).  The problematic response was 
20.9% in high-hazard domains such as emergency department or operating room.  Problematic 
response among hospital workers was up to 12 times greater than among aviators on certain 
questions. While further research on safety climate in health care is warranted, hospitals may 
need to make substantial changes to achieve a safety climate consistent with the status of high 
reliability organizations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Safety in industries of high intrinsic hazard, such as aviation, military operations, nuclear 
power, and health care is known to be a property primarily of systems rather than individuals. 
Organizations that perform successfully under very challenging conditions, with very low levels 
of failure, are termed “High Reliability Organizations” (HROs) (Gaba, 2001; Roberts, Rousseau, 
& La Porte, 1994; Rochlin, La Porte, & Roberts, 1987; Sagan, 1993).  Based on direct 
observation of HROs, investigators have determined that a key element of high reliability is a 
“culture of safety” permeating the organization (Gaba, Howard, & Jump, 1994; Roberts, 1993; 
Weick, 1987).  Such a culture is presumed to depend largely on shared values and norms of 
behavior articulated by senior management and translated with high uniformity into effective 
work practices at the front-line.  While there is widespread acceptance of cultural influences on 
safety there has been considerable debate concerning “safety culture” as an independent concept, 
and whether the attitudes and experiences expressed by personnel on questionnaires measure 
“culture” versus “climate” (Cox & Flin, 1998; Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000; 
Guldenmund, 2000; Hale, 2000).  According to Flin et al. (2000) “safety climate can be regarded 
as the surface features of the safety culture discerned from the workforce's attitudes and 
perceptions at a given point in time.  It is a snapshot of the state of safety providing an indicator 
of the underlying safety culture of a work group, plant or organization.”  We follow this usage in 
the remainder of the paper. 
Health care institutions strive to be HROs, providing technically challenging and intrinsically 
hazardous modalities of medical care to patients efficiently and safely (Gaba, 2001). The past 
twenty years have seen an increased emphasis in health care on human factors and systems 
oriented approaches to organizational safety that were originally pioneered in the transport and 
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energy sectors (Bogner, 1994; Cooper, Newbower, Long, & McPeek, 1978; Gaba, 1994; Gaba, 
Maxwell, & DeAnda, 1987; Gosbee, 2002; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Kohn, Corrigan, & 
Donaldson, 1999; Leape, 1994; Lin, Vicente, & Doyle, 2001; Reason, 1995, 2000; Weinger & 
Englund, 1990; Xiao, Hunter, Mackenzie, Jefferies, & Horst, 1996).   
The degree to which these health care organizations have a culture of safety supportive of 
high reliability and patient safety has only recently been explored.  Considerable work has 
focused on occupational safety for healthcare workers, particularly concerning needlestick 
exposure to blood-borne pathogens such as HIV (Clarke, Rockett, Sloane, & Aiken, 2002; 
Gershon et al., 2000; Vredenburgh, 2002).  More generally, surveys have been done classifying 
institutions into pre-defined cultural types (Wakefield et al., 2001) and relating these 
categorizations of a workplace organizational culture to specific care practices or patient 
outcome for specific diseases (Shortell et al., 2000; Shortell, Rousseau, Gillies, Devers, & 
Simons, 1991; Shortell et al., 1994; Zimmerman et al., 1994; Zimmerman et al., 1993).  Others 
have looked at specific issues such as production pressure (Gaba et al., 1994) or teamwork in 
particular work environments such as the operating room or intensive care unit (Helmreich & 
Merritt, 1998; Sexton, Thomas, & Helmreich, 2000).   
We recently reported data on safety related attitudes and experiences of personnel (i.e., safety 
climate) in a diverse set of hospitals in or near California, including public and private, for-profit 
and non-profit, teaching and non-teaching, large and small (Singer, et al., 2003).  This survey 
included a 100% sample of senior management and physicians as well as a 10% sample of all 
hospital employees in all work units.  We found that while the majority of respondents answered 
in ways indicating a good safety climate, a substantial minority of respondents (18% on average) 
gave answers that suggested the absence or antithesis of a safety climate; another 18% of 
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respondents were neutral.  What do these results mean?  Do the findings about the majority 
suggest the presence of a good safety climate (conducive to a culture of safety) consistent with 
HRO status, or do findings about the sizable minority indicate an incomplete penetration of HRO 
principles into the hospital work environment?  Zohar argues that safety climate can be assessed 
in terms of its “strength,” or consistency of response, as well as on its “level” of mean response 
for specific indicators (Zohar, 2001).  Our data on problematic response suggests a low strength 
of safety culture in health care, but how does this strength compare to that in a recognized HRO?  
Aircraft carrier flight operations were the first HRO studied in detail (Roberts et al., 1994; 
Rochlin et al., 1987).  Experts generally consider naval aviation, whether carrier-based or shore-
based, to be a classic HRO industry achieving very low rates of catastrophic failure while 
providing continuous operations in the face of high intrinsic hazard ((Ciavarelli, 2003); Karlene 
Roberts, personal communication, January 17, 2002).  For example, the rate of Class A accidents 
(fatality or greater than $1 million in damage) in Naval aviation since 1999 has been 
approximately 1.5 per 100,000 hours flown.  This rate has dropped from approximately 50 per 
100,000 hours in the 1950s.  While greater than the accident rate in commercial aviation, this 
rate is very low considering the complexity of the aircraft, the missions flown, and the unique 
demands of carrier-based launch and recovery.  The health care sector intends to be a high 
reliability organization with nearly failure free results, yet the accident rate is not known with 
certainty.  The data available (Kohn et al., 1999; Lagasse, 2002; Leape et al., 1991) suggest the 
rate is much higher than in military or commercial aviation.  
In this paper we describe an exploratory "natural experiment" in which we were able to 
construct questions concerning safety climate in the health care domain that were highly similar 
to questions already posed to naval aviators (the Navy uses the term “aviators” for its air crews) 
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in on-going assessments of their safety climate.  Because health care institutions may not have 
fully implemented organizational and cultural aspects of high reliability institutions (Committee 
On Quality Of Health Care In America, 2001; Gaba, 2001), we hypothesized that the rate of 
problematic response (answering in ways against a safety climate) to these similar questions 
would be substantially greater among health care workers than among naval aviators across all 
aspects of safety climate that the questions addressed.  In our study we concentrated on several 
specific aspects of a safety climate for which data were available for both domains (see table 1) 
although there are other aspects of safety climate that are not addressed (see for example (Flin et 
al., 2000).   
METHODS 
These data are the result of collaboration between ongoing efforts in health care and in naval 
aviation to assess the climate of safety in the respective domains.  The Naval Aviation Command 
Safety Assessment Survey (CSAS) was developed at the Naval Postgraduate School to aid 
commanders in assessing the safety climate of naval aviation units.  The CSAS is used both by 
squadron commanders for operational quality management, and by investigators for research at 
the Naval Postgraduate School.  Squadron commanders arrange for squadron personnel to 
complete the CSAS via the Internet.  Often, this is done during a “safety stand-down,” during 
which regular activities are suspended to allow training concerning safety.  The CSAS was based 
upon a conceptual model of HRO theory (Ciavarelli, Figlock, Sengupta, & Roberts, 2001).  The 
CSAS uses a Likert-type, five-point rating scale.   Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses 
of the CSAS questionnaire (administered to 1240 aviators) were completed. A three factor 
solution, using principal components with varimax rotation, was derived. The Cronbach-alpha 
reliabilities for the three factors were 0.97, 0.94, and 0.89, and these values are well within the 
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range of acceptable measurement reliability. The survey developers are continuing their efforts 
to validate the survey, using large samples of data from aviation squadrons. The CSAS can be 
reviewed at http://avsafety.nps.navy.mil/safesurv.htm
The Patient Safety Cultures in Healthcare Organizations (PSCHO) instrument is part of 
research assessments of work culture influences (safety climate and deeper features) on safety in 
hospitals.  It was initially constructed by the VA Palo Alto Patient Safety Center of Inquiry 
(PSCI), using questions adapted with permission from five existing surveys from various 
domains: The Naval CSAS described above (Ciavarelli, Figlock, & Sengupta, 1999; Ciavarelli et 
al., 2001);  Operating Room Management Attitudes Questionnaire (Helmreich & Schaefer, 
1994);  Anesthesia Work Environment Study (Gaba et al., 1994);  Risk Management 
Questionnaire (Roberts, 1990), and Safety Orientation in Medical Facilities (Augustine, Weick, 
Bagian, & Lee, 1998).  These instruments have partially overlapping questions covering 16 
topics.  For use in the PSCHO we selected questions from the underlying surveys to cover each 
of the 16 topics.  The PSCHO instrument clearly explained to participants that "patient safety" 
referred to activities or events harmful to patients and did not relate to the occupational safety of 
the workers themselves.  The complete survey may be viewed at 
http://healthpolicy.stanford.edu/PtSafety/indexjs.htm 
A preliminary paper form of the PSCHO survey instrument was tested in two pilot studies of 
approximately 600 personnel each.  Based on feedback from the pilot studies, the survey 
instrument was modified and revised, for example to make the questions more concrete.  The 
revised version containing 94 questions was used in mailing waves 1 and 2 of the PSCHO 
administration discussed in this paper.  A 34-question version was mailed to non-responders in a 
third wave.  Unless otherwise specified, results reported here are from the 94-question tool used 
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in the first and second wave.  Principal components factor analysis was conducted on the 
responses to the 94-question survey (with a varimax rotation to maximize the loadings on each 
factor). This yielded five factors, which accounted for 80% of the systematic variation across 
questions. Based on the questions that loaded most heavily to each factor, we labeled these 
factors as “organization”, “department”, “production”, “reporting/seeking help”, "and 
shame/self-awareness” (Singer et al., 2003).  Note that the factor analyses of the complete CSAS 
and PSCHO instruments cannot be extrapolated directly to the sub-set of similar questions 
discussed in this paper. 
Derivation of Similar Questions from the CSAS to the PSCHO 
Twenty-three (23) questions on the PSCHO instrument were derived directly from the CSAS 
instrument that had already been in use for two years in the Navy.  Questions were chosen that 
seemed possible to adapt to the health care environment and that covered as many of the PSCHO 
topics as possible.  The wording of CSAS questions was modified by the healthcare and naval 
researchers to make it appropriate for a hospital setting.  For example, the term "command 
leadership" is used frequently in the Navy questions.  This term is not applicable in health care.  
Depending on the question (and to meet other needs of the PSCHO survey) this term was 
translated either as "senior management" or as "my department".   
Survey Administration, Sampling, and Response Rates 
The CSAS and the PSCHO were administered in different fashions and over different periods 
of time.  The sample for the Navy CSAS survey was not randomly drawn from the population of 
US Naval Aviation units.  Rather, squadron commanders voluntarily requested this 
organizational safety assessment.  Results reported here are from surveys of 226 squadrons (of 
approximately 450 eligible Navy and Marine Corps squadrons). During the period 1998 to 2001, 
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on one or more days chosen by each squadron commander, all of the squadron’s aviators were 
asked to complete the CSAS anonymously (identified only by squadron) via the Internet.  
Respondents returned 6,901 surveys.  The overall response rate was approximately 80%, with no 
less than a 65% return for any squadron. 
The sample of participating hospitals was also not random.  Rather, hospitals were 
participants in the Patient Safety Consortium, selected for their initiative in promoting patient 
safety, their geographic location (mostly in Northern California), and their diversity in size, type 
of hospital, and hospital system affiliation.  Within the 15 participating hospitals, the intended 
survey sample included 100% of attending physicians, 100% of senior management (department 
head or above), and a 10% random sample of all other hospital employees.  We surveyed 100% 
of senior management because this employee group is a small fraction of the whole.  We 
surveyed 100% of physicians because they are fewer in number than nurses and other 
employees, and the response rate of physicians was expected to be relatively low based on our 
pilot surveys.  This sampling strategy allowed us to achieve an adequate number of respondents 
for each class of employees.   
The total number of eligible, unique individuals receiving survey packets was 6,312, across 
all 15 hospitals.  The initial mailing list included 6906 names; however, 347 duplicate names 
were removed from the list as well as 227 surveys that were returned to us as undeliverable (e.g., 
employee retired, was a temporary worker, no longer employed).  For logistical reasons two 
hospitals surveyed 25% and 21% of their physicians respectively; and a third hospital surveyed 
too few physicians to analyze separately.  Respondents returned 2,989 anonymous surveys, for 
an overall response rate of 47.4%.  The response rate excluding physicians was 62%; the 
response rate for physicians was 33%. 
  10 
Hospitals distributed the surveys to hospital employees via inter-office mail or US mail in 
three separate waves between April and June 2001.  Successive mailings were separated by 
about four weeks.  The survey packet included a cover letter co-signed by a research investigator 
and a senior executive from the respective hospital, a paper version of the survey instrument, a 
business-reply return envelope, instructions for completing the survey on the Internet if desired, 
and a separate questionnaire completion notification (QCN) card.  We asked respondents to 
return the QCN postcards separately; this allowed us to discontinue sending additional survey 
packets to individuals who had responded to the survey without compromising the anonymity of 
the survey.  Additional details about the development and results of this survey are reported in a 
previous publication (Singer et al., 2003).   
Data Analysis 
We compared the aggregate responses to the similar questions in the hospital PSCHO to 
those in the Navy CSAS.  Because the hospital personnel in the overall sample included many 
different job types we also conducted an analysis comparing responses of the aviators to the 
subset of hospital personnel from areas with particularly dynamic, high-hazard work 
characteristics (operating room, emergency department, intensive care unit, pediatric intensive 
care unit).  Respondents from these areas, mostly nurses and physicians who deal with situations 
of high intrinsic risk on a regular basis, should have the closest parallels in the cognitive work 
environment to that of naval aviators. 
For all comparisons, we defined as “problematic response” the proportion of responses 
(agreement or disagreement depending on the question) suggesting a lack of or antithesis to 
safety climate.  Neutral responses were not included as problematic.  For each question, we 
determined whether the difference in proportion of problematic response between the groups was 
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statistically significant using Chi-square analysis.  To correct for multiple comparisons we 
required p<0.001 for any comparison to consider it significant.  We also computed the ratio 
between the problematic response of health care personnel (all respondents) to that of naval 
aviators (Table 1B).   
Non-response Bias: Data presented here for both surveys are raw un-weighted values with no 
correction for unit non-response.  We did not have access to demographic profiles of hospital 
personnel to compare the characteristics of the responders versus the non-responders.  In Singer 
et al. (2003) we used weighting of PSCHO data to account for the differential sampling by job-
type and for non-response bias.  For all questions the rate of problematic response in the un-
weighted data presented here is very close to that in the weighted analyses.  Also in Singer et al 
(2003) we presented sensitivity analyses for potential non-response bias in the PSCHO data, 
comparing by wave of survey response (Dillman, Eltinge, Groves, & Little, 2001; Platek & 
Gray, 1983).  This suggested no significant effect of response bias on the overall results.  Finally, 
for the current analysis, we consider the effect of the worst-case non-response bias.  Even 
assuming that all PSCHO non-responders would have answered all questions in a "non-
problematic" way (a very unlikely occurrence), the overall rate of problematic response by health 
care workers would be reduced by approximately a factor of two (since the response rate was 
approximately 50%).  Such a reduction would not change the fundamental conclusions of this 
paper.  
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RESULTS 
Naval aviators compared to hospital personnel overall   
Table 2 shows problematic response by the naval aviators and the hospital employees for the 
23 questions that were directly linked between the two surveys.  Average overall problematic 
response for the naval aviators was 5.6%, compared to 17.5% for hospital personnel, an 
aggregate difference of 11.9%.  Problematic response to individual questions ranged from 1.2% 
to 29.5% for naval personnel, and from 1.9% to 55.1% for hospital workers.  Problematic 
response among hospital workers was up to 12 times greater than among aviators (Table 1B).  
Differences between the groups were statistically significant for all questions (p<0.0001).  The 
responses to the 11 matched questions that were retained in the abridged survey used in the third 
mailing wave of the hospital PSCHO was slightly less problematic on average than in the first 
two waves, making the three-wave problematic response for this subset of questions 20.4% 
(versus 21.7% for wave 1& 2 only).  There was only 7.7% problematic response by naval 
aviators to these 11 questions, yielding a 12.7 percentage point difference.   
Professionals in high-hazard health care domains compared to Navy aviators 
Problematic response to individual questions from those in high hazard hospital domains 
ranged from 2.6% to 59.4%, with an average of 20.9%.  This was significantly more problematic 
than for hospital workers as a whole (p<0.001).  Problematic response among high-hazard 
hospital workers was up to 16 times greater than among aviators (Table 2).     
DISCUSSION 
 Respondents to the Patient Safety Cultures in Healthcare Organizations survey were three 
times as likely on average to give a problematic response to similar questions than were naval 
aviators taking the Command Safety Assessment Survey.  These findings were true both for the 
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aggregate of all health care respondents, and even more strikingly, for respondents from 
particularly hazardous health care arenas.  
We found a few similarities between hospital personnel and navy aviators regarding specific 
safety climate features covered by the matched questions (Table 1B).  In both sectors 
respondents were highly uniform in their belief that their institution is committed to and has a 
good reputation for safety.  They both express concern about the level of resources provided for 
them to accomplish their jobs, although health care workers are even more concerned than 
aviators about the effect of the loss of experienced personnel on safety (Q2).  Nonetheless, for 
most questions on all aspects of safety climate we saw low rates of problematic response by 
naval aviators (generally under 10%) and a higher rate of problematic response in health care 
workers, by a factor of three or more (Table 1B). 
Limitations of the Study 
Representativeness of the Data:  The data from the PSCHO are a very comprehensive 
assessment about a broad set of attitudes and experiences of workers in the diverse set of 
hospitals studied.  It used a rigorous sampling methodology and targeted a wide cross section of 
health care workers including senior management.  Nonetheless, the survey was sent to only 
6,312 individuals, with slightly less than 3,000 of them responding.  While a variety of hospital 
types were studied, the number of hospitals was too few to represent a complete sample of all 
institutions.  The CSAS has been administered to about half of eligible naval aviation squadrons.  
 A problem for both surveys is that participation of the target organization is completely 
voluntary.  Hospitals surveyed belong to a Patient Safety Consortium interested in improving 
patient safety in their organizations.  We presume that these are leading institutions rather than 
laggards, although it is possible that some participate because they wish to correct serious, 
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known deficiencies.  Similarly, squadron commanders requesting the CSAS are presumed to be 
enlightened leaders seeking organizational improvement, although we cannot rule out that some 
participated to find solutions to serious command problems.  We thus assume that the data from 
these surveys are closer to the “best case” rather than to the “worst case” for organizations in 
their domain.  The assumption that participating organizations were relative safety leaders can 
only be confirmed by studying a larger sample and more complete cross-section of organizations 
(from good to bad), with comparisons to external “gold-standard” performance criteria if they 
can be delineated. 
Differences in the Method of Survey Administration and the Population Surveyed:  The 
timing and method of administration of the surveys differed between the domains.  The Navy 
survey was administered to different squadrons over a three-year period, the hospital surveys 
over six months toward the end of the naval sampling.  Perhaps more importantly, the naval 
surveys were often administered as part of a safety stand-down when issues of safety would be 
more salient to the respondents.  Health care has no equivalent of safety stand-downs (itself a 
potentially significant organizational difference) and the surveys were administered by mail 
directly to participants in multiple waves.  
The wording of questions was not perfectly matched between the domains.  The terms 
"command leadership" and "my command" used in the Navy are not as specific as the terms 
"senior management" or "my department" (or for one question "supervisors") used in health care.  
If, for example, naval aviators considered the command leadership to consist only of their 
squadron leaders (which is made up mostly of active aviators) the rest of the unit is likely to feel 
that they know what is going on with the squadron's actual operations.  In contrast, the senior 
managers in health care are more removed from the front-line workers (although some are active 
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clinicians themselves).  In the detailed analysis of the PSCHO data we found that managers who 
were clinicians responded closer to front-line clinicians than did managers who were not 
clinicians (Singer et al., 2003). 
These differences in method of administration might account for some of the results, but we 
believe that they are unlikely to account for the profound (three-fold) differences seen between 
the groups.  Moreover, comparison between the most analogous sub-groups (aviators vs. hospital 
workers in particularly hazardous domains) showed even greater disparities.   
Previous Research   
While previous research has explored related issues, findings from this study substantially 
expand the knowledge base about safety climate in healthcare organizations.  Neal and Griffin 
(2000) tested a model of hypothesized causal elements for safety performance (organizational 
climate and safety climate leading to safety knowledge and safety motivation, and then to safety 
compliance and safety program participation) using data from 525 employees in a single 
Australian hospital.  While the structural equation modeling was able to verify most aspects of 
their causal model they do not provide scale-level or question-level data on the results from 
healthcare workers comparable to our results.  A study by Gershon et al. (2000) of attitudes 
regarding hospital safety climate and occupational safety related to blood-borne pathogens had 
some questions similar to those in the PSCHO and CSAS.  For example, 67.9% of their 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed that "On my unit there is open communication between 
supervisors and staff" (they do not provide data for the two categories of "disagree"). 
Respondents to the PSCHO answered analogous questions similarly (Q3a/Q3b) with 61.9% 
agree or strongly agree, and 19.3% problematic, whereas the naval aviators had a 10.8% 
problematic response.  
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Some analogous work has been published by Helmreich, Sexton, and others looking at team 
behaviors and attitudes in surveys of physicians and nurses in anesthesia, surgery, and ICU as 
compared to equivalent data from cockpit crewmembers in commercial aviation (Helmreich & 
Merritt, 1998; Sexton et al., 2000).  The Operating Room Management Attitudes Questionnaire 
(ORMAQ) and the Intensive Care Management Attitudes Questionnaire (ICUMAQ) contain 23 
items matched to the Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire (CMAQ) that has been 
administered to over 30,000 airline pilots (with response rates across different airlines averaging 
45%).  A few questions partially relate to safety culture issues.  Data from only a handful of the 
matched questions have been reported in the literature.  The results are similar to our own.  A 
higher fraction of physicians and nurses provided a “problematic response” compared to that for 
pilots for four questions about teamwork and stress (Sexton et al., 2000).  In these studies the 
differences among the healthcare disciplines were much larger than the differences between the 
aggregate of health care workers versus the pilots.  In contrast, our comparison of the PSCHO to 
the CSAS found much greater differences (three-fold on average) between healthcare workers 
and aviators than we found among hospitals, job classes, or between clinicians vs. non-clinicians 
in health care (Singer et al., 2003).  
Organizational Aspects of Each of the Domains 
We are confident that despite some of the differences in methodology, timing, and wording 
of the instruments used in this exploratory natural experiment, the overall pattern of results do 
stem primarily from actual differences between the organizational practices and cultures of the 
industries. Hospitals are organized differently than are naval aviation units, and have notably 
different operational characteristics.  We have previously articulated differences between the 
structure and organization of healthcare as an industry in comparison to other industries such as 
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commercial aviation (Gaba, 2001).  The same dissimilarities are equally applicable in 
comparison to naval aviation.   
Naval aviation is a highly-controlled, centralized industry.  There is only one “parent 
company” (the United States Navy) with many diverse “firms,” (e.g. “fleets” or “commands”) 
each containing many facilities and work groups.  There are substantial economies of scale.  The 
company and firms exert strong controls on safety procedures, and personnel qualifications, 
training, and assignments.  Naval aviators are a very homogenous population with strong cultural 
values regarding professionalism and command and peer loyalty.  Hospitals, on the other hand, 
are not under a single command authority.  Even within a single hospital there is fairly weak 
control of procedures and personnel.  In some hospitals certain key personnel (e.g. physicians) 
are even private firms of their own, working under the umbrella of the hospital, not under its 
direct control.  The survey data show that aviators believe that their command exerts strong 
control over issues such as resources, safety procedures, and process auditing, while a substantial 
fraction of health care workers believe that their hospitals or departments do not.  Health care is 
not a “total institution” like the military, in which “… members are isolated from a wider society 
and can therefore be more intensely socialized and trained,” (quotation of Goffman in Sagan, 
1993, p. 23).   Further studies of different types of organizations in different industrial domains 
will be needed to determine if a uniform safety climate can be achieved without the level of 
control of personnel and procedures imposed by the military. 
There is strong reason to believe that health care institutions can improve their organization 
without military controls (Committee on Quality of Health Care in America, 2001; Kohn et al., 
1999).  Specific work units termed clinical “microsystems” have been a recent focus for analysis.  
Some microsystems have been found to operate with apparently greater efficiency, safety, and 
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resolve than many of their counterparts (Donaldson & Mohr, 2000; Mohr & Batalden, 2002; 
Nelson et al., 2002).  In fact, in the empirical studies of microsystems, “leadership," "culture," 
and "organizational support" were found to be three of nine key characteristics of success.  The 
characteristics of these successful small units may be expanded to encompass more units within 
hospitals, and to hospitals as a whole. 
Further research 
Our results indicate that further studies comparing healthcare organizations, naval aviation, 
and other high-hazard domains may be fruitful. We are attempting to relate results on the 
PSCHO to statistical markers of clinical quality and patient outcome in hospitals.  This would 
assess the predictive validity of the safety climate assessments.  Because the PSCHO to date has 
been administered in only 15 hospitals, data are needed from more institutions of greater 
diversity, geographic spread, and level of safety performance.  It would also be useful to have 
analogous data from military hospitals.  Unlike their civilian counterparts these hospitals share 
with naval aviation certain elements of military organization including tighter institutional 
control of personnel and considerations of military rank. 
Within the non-health care components of the military, data are needed across more 
disciplines and departments, and especially from the senior managers of large organizations, 
such as the command structure of an entire ship or base rather than just of a squadron.  In the 
future we hope to acquire data from entire naval battle-groups and possibly from samples of an 
entire branch of the military (e.g. the Marine Corps). 
Other non-military hazardous industries offer other interesting organizational and structural 
comparisons both to naval aviation and to health care.  Commercial aviation has a safer accident 
record than does naval aviation, and does not have the regimented control of the military.  
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Nuclear reactor operators in the civilian sector could be compared to their naval counterparts.   
Non-aviation transport industries such as maritime, railroads, and trucking may offer different 
perspectives.  The chemical manufacturing industry has a wide spectrum of firm sizes that may 
mirror the diversity in size of organizations found in health care.  The further exploration of 
safety climate, and ultimately safety culture, in healthcare will be valuable in its own right and 
also as component of a generalized theory of operational safety for all hazardous domains.   
What Can Health Care Institutions Do?   
While these exploratory data do not by themselves prove that health care lacks an appropriate 
climate of safety, it appears that naval aviation – an acknowledged HRO – has gone much farther 
in generating a uniform set of safety-oriented beliefs and norms amongst its practitioners.  If 
these data are true what could hospitals do to change their safety climate?  The data indicate that 
hospital leaders' avowed commitment to safety has not translated sufficiently into a climate in 
which safety and organizational processes aimed at safety are valued uniformly.  In hospitals 
more than in naval aviation, the organization does not strongly manage day-to-day operations 
from a safety standpoint.  There are several strategies to address these and other issues of 
bolstering the safety climate. 
Top Down Strategies:  The survey results suggest that management in health care is viewed 
by too many workers as isolated from the front lines and ignorant of the true hazards and 
demands that exist.  There are a variety of interventions that might help senior managers better 
understand the clinical world, and better translate their commitment to safety to the front-line.  
Our group has developed an intervention (termed Inward Bound:  Workplace Expeditions for 
Executives) modeled after the business technique of Management by Walking Around (Peters & 
Waterman, 1982).  This program has executives making one-on-one visits to front-line workers 
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to watch them (and assist if feasible) as they do their daily work.  Another intervention termed 
WalkRounds™ (Frankel et al., 2003) has executives conducting patient safety meetings in the 
clinical workplace so as to hear from large numbers of front-line workers.  The effectiveness of 
these interventions is not yet established however. 
A longer-term top-down strategy would require more intensive prospective safety 
management of health care work by the institution, with increased auditing of adherence to 
standard operating procedures and standards.  This kind of involvement may be seen in the 
exemplar clinical microsystems that have been studied (Donaldson & Mohr, 2000; Mohr & 
Batalden, 2002; Nelson et al., 2002).  Considerable work remains to be done to determine the 
applicability and limits of this approach. 
Bottom up strategies:  One study of occupational safety in hospitals suggests that the most 
effective strategy was careful selection and training of new hires coupled with verification of 
safe procedures in the work environment (Vredenburgh, 2002).  Another strategy being explored 
is to provide training to employees (especially those with direct patient contact) on human 
factors and teamwork issues in health care (Barrett, Gifford, Morey, Risser, & Salisbury, 2001; 
Bower, 2002; Firth-Cozens, 2001; Morey et al., 2002).  In some cases this is accomplished using 
very realistic simulations for clinicians in high-hazard domains (Gaba, Howard, Fish, Smith, & 
Sowb, 2001; Holzman et al., 1995; Howard, Gaba, Fish, Yang, & Sarnquist, 1992; Kurrek & 
Fish, 1996; Marsch, 1998; Sica, Barron, Blum, Frenna, & Raemer, 1999; Small et al., 1999).  
Such bottom-up efforts are expected to have direct effects on teamwork, redundancy, and 
adherence to safe practices.  They could also have indirect effects on improving the uniformity of 
the safety climate, by providing concrete exercises to relate abstract cultural concepts to the 
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operational world of clinical work.  Studies are currently underway to determine whether 
changes in safety climate do in fact result from teamwork-oriented simulation training. 
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Table 1A and 1B: Aspects of Safety Climate 
Table 1A Table 1B 
Aspect of Safety Climate Question 
Number* 
Ratio of problematic 
response in health care / 
naval aviation 
(All health care workers) 
Senior leadership articulates an institutional 
commitment to safety and conveys it uniformly to 











Following standard operating procedures and safety 





The organization proactively manages safety and 


























Communication between workers and across 





There is openness about errors and problems; they are 
reported when they occur 
Q9 2.5 
* See Table 2 for the individual question wording and data 
† Problematic response of naval aviators is greater than 10% 
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Table 2.  Percent problematic response to Navy CSAS and Hospital PSCHO questions by naval aviators, hospital personnel, and 
personnel in high hazard health care domains 
  Problematic Response (%) 




Personnel in High 
Hazard Health 
Care Domains 
 Unweighted N 6901 2125 632 
1 I am provided adequate resources ([time, staffing, / personnel] budget, and equipment) to 
[accomplish my job / provide safe patient care]* 29.5   33.7 36.7
2 [Lack / Loss] of experienced personnel has [adversely / negatively] affected [my command's / my] 
ability to [operate safely / to provide high quality patient care]* 18.5 55.1 59.4 
3a Within my command, good communications flow exists up and down the chain of command / Good 
communication flow exists down the chain of command regarding patient safety issues* 10.8 19.0 21.6 
3b Within my command, good communications flow exists up and down the chain of command / Good 
communication flow exists up the chain of command regarding patient safety issues* 10.8   19.7 23.5
4 [My command /Senior management] does not hesitate to temporarily restrict [from flying individuals 
/clinicians] who are under high personal stress  7.8 37.1 45.4 
5 [Command leadership / Senior management] reacts well to unexpected changes to its plans  7.4 26.8 34.8 
6 In [my command, peer influence is effective at discouraging violations of standard operating 
procedures, or safety rules / In my department, there is significant peer pressure to discourage unsafe 
patient care 5.6   17.2 17.7
7 My command ensures the uniform enforcement of all operating standards among unit members / My 
department uniformly prescribes performance standards to ensure patient safety 5.5   13.8 17.0
8 [My command has a defined process to set training goals and to review performance / My department 
follows a specific process to review performance against defined training goals* 5.1 16.0 16.8 
9 Individuals in [my command / my department] are willing to report [safety violations, unsafe 
behaviors or hazardous conditions / behavior which is unsafe for patient care]* 4.2 10.4 13.5 
10 In [my command / my department],[ violations of operating procedures, flying regulations, or general 
flight disciplines / disregarding policy and procedures] is rare*  4.0   13.3 13.2
11 [Safety / Patient Safety] decisions are made at the proper levels, by the most qualified people [in my 
command]* 4.0   18.5 22.2
12 [My command / my department] closely monitors [proficiency and currency standards / performance] 
to ensure [aircrew are qualified to fly / clinicians are qualified] 3.3 17.3 21.0 
13 [Command leadership / People in leadership positions] sets the example for compliance with [flight 
standards / policies and procedures that promote safe patient care] 3.0 12.3 15.7 
14 [My command / Senior management] provides a [positive command climate / positive climate] that 
promotes [safe flight operations / patient safety]* 2.7   16.1 21.6
15 [My command /Senior management] provides adequate safety backups to catch possible human 
errors during high-risk [mission / patient care activities] 2.7 23.7 31.5 
16 [My command / This facility] has a reputation for high-quality performance  2.4 5.5 4.9 
17 I am adequately trained to safely conduct all of my flights / Staff are provided with the necessary 
training to safely provide patient care* 2.2 11.3 12.9 
18 [My command / Supervisors] conduct adequate reviews and updates of [safety standards and 2.1 14.9 19.3 
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  Problematic Response (%) 




Personnel in High 
Hazard Health 
Care Domains 
operating procedures / patient safety practices] 
19 [Command leadership / Senior management] is successful in communicating its [safety / patient 
safety goals] to [unit personnel / hospital/clinic personnel] 2.0 16.6 18.9 
20 [Command leadership / Senior management] has a clear picture of the risks associated with [its flight 
operations / patient care]* 1.9   21.9 30.6
21 [My command / My department] does a good job managing risks [associated with its flight 
operations / to ensure patient safety]* 1.9   8.5 11.8
22 [My command / My department] takes the time to identify and assess risks [associated with its flight 
operations / to patient safety] 1.6   10.1 12.5
23 [My command / Staff] is genuinely concerned about [safety / patient safety] 1.2 1.9 2.6 
     AVERAGE 5.6 17.5 20.9
The Navy CSAS combines questions 3a and 3b into one while the PSCHO survey includes two separate questions.  To calculate the aggregate problematic 
response for each industry, the total problematic response percentage for questions 3a and 3b for hospital personnel was divided by two and the problematic 
response for naval aviators to the combined question 3a/3b was included as is.  
 “High hazard areas” include emergency room/urgent care, intensive care unit, and operating room/post-anesthesia care unit. 
All differences observed between naval aviators and hospital personnel are significant, with p<.0001 for each question. 
* Indicates this question was included in all three waves of PSCHO survey mailing. 
** Percent problematic response is based on responses to the PSCHO survey from waves 1 and 2 only. 
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